Friday, October 23, 2020

The World Health Organisation's pandemic strategy was (and is) predictably deadly - Part 1

[Minor edits were made to his post on 2nd November 2020 to correct a few typos and aid clarity for the reader.]

The World Health Organisation's pandemic strategy was (and is) predictably deadly for any novel virus which causes significant mortality and has significant cryptotransmission.

The World Health Organisation's fundamentally flawed pandemic strategy has already caused a million avoidable deaths from Covid-19 and counting!

This series of posts seeks to explain why the WHO pandemic strategy is deadly and, with respect to Covid-19, why it has already caused more than a million avoidable deaths around the world.

To understand why those million plus avoidable deaths from Covid-19 have occurred we need to dip into International Law as well as consider virology and epidemiology.

This post, Part 1 of the series, addresses some of the International Law which provides the context to the functioning of the World Health Organisation, including the legal constraints on how the World Health Organisation may respond to a potential pandemic.

The key factor in the World Health Organisation's pandemic strategy causing more than a million avoidable deaths from Covid-19 comes from the application of the International Health Regulations (2005).

The International Health Regulations (2005) form part of International Law. 

There are reasons to question the legality of the International Health Regulations (2005) but such issues need not concern us here, since it is the interpretation placed on the Regulations by the World Health Organisation and its lawyers which have contributed to the million plus avoidable deaths from Covid-19.

The International Health Regulations (2005) exist in a wider context of International Law.

The World Health Organisation is an organ of the United Nations.

It was set up under Article 57 of the UN Charter:

Article 57

1.  The  various  specialized   agencies,  established  by intergovernmental  agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as  defined in  their  basic  instruments,  in  economic,  social, cultural,  educational,  health,  and  related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of Article 63.

2.  Such  agencies  thus  brought  into  relationship with the  United  Nations are hereinafter  referred  to as specialized agencies.

The UN Charter is available online here:

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The Constitution of the World Health Organisation is here:

CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Article 21 of the WHO Constitution gives the World Health Assembly authority to create regulations in the following terms:

Article 21

The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning:

(a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease;
(b) nomenclatures  with  respect  to  diseases,  causes  of  death  and  public health practices;
(c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use;
(d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical  and  similar  products  moving  in  international  commerce;
(e) advertising  and  labelling  of  biological,  pharmaceutical  and  similar products moving in international commerce.

In 2005 the 58th World Health Assembly made use of the authority to adopt regulations as expressed in Article 21 of the WHO Constitution and approved the International Health Regulations 2005.

A copy of the International Health Regulations (2005), as modified in 2016, is located here:

International Health Regulations (2005) Third Edition

The changes made in 2008 and 2016 to the International Health Regulations (2005) are not relevant to issues relating to the avoidable deaths from Covid-19.

The International Health Regulations (2005) set out in International Law how the World Health Organisation and its member states must act.

Article 1 of the International Health Regulations 2005 consists of several pages of definitions which govern the interpretation of the Regulations.

The seemingly innocuous Article 2 of the International Health Regulations 2005 is expressed in the following terms:

Article 2 Purpose and scope

The purpose and scope of these Regulations are to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.

The effect of the final phrase, "which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade" is deadly.

It means that the World Health Organisation cannot act with respect to a developing pandemic unless that action has no effect on international traffic and/or trade or unless data has been collected which demonstrates that it is "necessary" to interfere with "international traffic and trade".

Notice too that the "public health response" is to "the international spread of disease".

That has the deadly effect that the WHO, as a matter of International Law (at least as interpreted by the WHO), CANNOT act in an effective way (which necessarily involves early interventions in international traffic and trade, as I will explain in a later Part of this series of posts) until a new disease has already spread internationally and data has been collected that demonstrate that a response is necessary!

Article 12 of the International Health Regulations (2005) illustrates how International Law constrains how the World Health Organisation can act.

I give the full text of Article 12 here to illustrate that complexity:

Article 12
Determination of a public health emergency of international concern

1. The Director-General shall determine, on the basis of the information received, in particular from the State Party within whose territory an event is occurring, whether an event constitutes a public health emergency of international concern in accordance with the criteria and the procedure set out in these Regulations.

2. If the Director-General considers, based on an assessment under these Regulations, that a public health emergency of international concern is occurring, the Director-General shall consult with the State Party in whose territory the event arises regarding this preliminary determination. If the Director-General and the State Party are in agreement regarding this determination, the Director-General shall, in accordance with the procedure set forth in Article 49, seek the views of the Committee established under Article 48 (hereinafter the “Emergency Committee”) on appropriate temporary recommendations.

3. If, following the consultation in paragraph 2 above, the Director-General and the State Party in whose territory the event arises do not come to a consensus within 48 hours on whether the event constitutes a public health emergency of international concern, a determination shall be made in accordance with the procedure set forth in Article 49.

4. In determining whether an event constitutes a public health emergency of international concern, the Director-General shall consider:
(a) information provided by the State Party;
(b) the decision instrument contained in Annex 2;
(c) the advice of the Emergency Committee;
(d) scientific principles as well as the available scientific evidence and other relevant
information; and
(e) an assessment of the risk to human health, of the risk of international spread of disease
and of the risk of interference with international traffic.

5. If the Director-General, following consultations with the State Party within whose territory the public health emergency of international concern has occurred, considers that a public health emergency of international concern has ended, the Director-General shall take a decision in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 49.

The decision to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern is personal to the Director General as stated in Paragraph 1.

However the Director General can only declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern after following the procedure outlined in Paragraphs 2 to 4, including convening a meeting of the Emergency Committee.

This bureaucratic process takes time.

During that time a novel virus is allowed to continue largely unchecked. 

The disastrous effect of the International Health Regulations (2005) is that the WHO cannot declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern until a novel virus has spread widely.

The effect of the International Health Regulations (2005) is that the World Health Organisation cannot, as a matter of International Law (as interpreted by the WHO), take effective action until a novel virus has already spread internationally.

The delay caused by the International Health Regulations (2005) means that for a virus like SARS-CoV-2 the optimal time for intervention has already passed.

The result, so far, is that more than a million deaths have occured from Covid-19 and that enormous avoidable damage has been caused to the economy worldwide.



Wednesday, October 21, 2020

Disastrously bad policy at the World Health Organisation has caused a million avoidable deaths and counting

 As I write this post the John Hopkins Covid-19 dashboard shows that Covid-19 has caused over 1 million deaths worldwide.


Those 1 million deaths and counting are all attributable to a disastrous policy at the World Health Organisation.

In future posts I will attempt to explain the reasoning that leads me to such a startling conclusion.